By year’s end the city of Mosul will be occupied by a force intent on keeping control while simultaneous being surrounded and liberated by a force made up of multiple groups with multiple goals. This is a recipe for disaster and disunity. Currently the Iraqi plan is for parts of the Iraqi National Army and Nineveh province militias to spearhead the assault into Mosul while all the forces envelop the city. From there, the areas that are liberated will be secured by Kurdish Peshmerga and Shi’ite militias. While Mosul is made up of different ethnic and religious groups, due to the violence, the main ethno-religious group left in Mosul is Sunni Arabs.

Current reporting puts the number of ISIL fighters in Mosul anywhere between 1000 and 2000 able bodied men. I’m not sure how reliable this number can be considering Mosul is a city, now, housing over 600,000 people. Since ISIL gained control of Mosul in 2014 they have instituted changes to the education system. A 12 year old in 2014 is now 14 with two years of ISIL indoctrination fed on a daily basis, and ISIL does not shy away from using child soldiers. Worse, a disenfranchised youth at 16 in Mosul has now turned 18 and fed the lies of martyrdom by ISIL. Mosul has had two years of ISIL Islamic Law, today most males in Mosul all look and dress the same- so which is the ISIL fighter and which is someone growing a beard to stay alive. So there may have been 1000 to 2000 ISIL fighters in Mosul at some point but it’s a stretch to believe that number today. ISIL has fully blended into the population of Mosul. For Sunni militia members from the Nineveh province, they are surely aware of the careful nature needed of liberating a city where the enemy now hides in plain day amongst the population. The care needed to differentiate between someone with a beard who grew the beard to survive the reign of ISIL and a beard belonging to a harden fighter.

Shi’ite and Kurdish fighters may not look for the differences between residents of Mosul as carefully as the Nineveh province militias. In Ramadi and Tikrit, which were retaken by primarily Shi’ite forces, if you were in the wrong area and looked the wrong way it may cost your life. The timescale to retake Mosul, which will be longer than the battles to retake Ramadi and Tikrit, gives enough time for mistakes to become grievances. Remember, since the Iraqi government plans to cut off all lines of retreat every mistake the Iraqi forces make will create a grievance that ISIL can exploit. The members of ISIL will be stuck inside Mosul with two options: win or die. To necessitate a victory ISIL will need more and more troops. While being cut off from traditional reinforcements from Syria they have an entire city under their control. Each innocent man killed means a new recruit for ISIL if they have a child. Each business looted by a Shi’ite militia means a new recruit for ISIL. These mistakes and behaviors have already happened in other parts of Iraq so it should not come as a surprise when they occur in Mosul again. Moreover, mistakes in governance and the abuse of power by the Shi’ite government led by Nouri al-Maliki allowed for ISIL to be welcomed in Sunni areas of Iraq.

The Iraqi coalition looking to take back Mosul has to perfectly execute their military strategy since they have abandoned the maxim of allowing your enemy an avenue of retreat. It would be a moving catastrophe if forward forces made up of Sunni militias looked back and saw Shi’ite militias looting recently liberated areas. No matter the reasoning behind the Shi’ite looting, even if the militia needed food, perception is everything. It would immediately trigger amongst the Sunni fighters the idea “what and who are we fighting for?” This same line of thinking caused Sunni tribes to allow ISIL into a city like Ramadi as the Iraqi government forces, and the government itself, was failing to meet their obligations in defending Ramadi.

What will underscore fears of instability is the lack of troop commitment to retake Mosul. Having only 25,000 to 35,000 disparate forces to retake and re-administer government control in Mosul could easily allow for any ISIL operatives, assuming they lose, to continue the destabilizing terror attacks that allowed their entry in the first place. The first thing ISIL did when they rolled their pick-ups, tanks, and humvees into Mosul was remove any and all roadblocks/checkpoints put in place by the Iraqi government. The people of Mosul rejoiced at just the idea of feeling free again, even if it meant their new rulers would enforce draconian quasi religious laws. If the prior force of 5,000 well armed Iraqi National Army forces fled at the sight of ISIL what makes the Iraqi government so sure that they can begin administering control once again. Mosul after ISIL will be a fully war torn city with a remaining population rife with grievances with little avenues to readdress their grievances. To leave security control in the hands of the Nineveh province militias, backed by Kurdish forces, seems like the most sensible approach. However, the government out of Baghdad has yet to prove they can consistently deliver weapon shipments to the Sunnis or Kurds. Instead, much to the lament of American officials, weapon shipments sent to Baghdad earmarked for the Kurds or Sunnis end up bolstering the already impressive armaments of Shi’ite militias. A successful Mosul campaign would need to flip the script of how the Iraqi government has behaved with regards to Iraqi minorities since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

This is the slow grind of destruction Mosul stands against. The desire to be liberated, but by a liberator that will do as much destruction as the occupier. The citizens of Mosul are caught in a paradox of living under an oppressor of their own ethno-religious background or return to being governed by Baghdad that was a corrupting force on the city. There may come a time were ISIL will be forced into a situation between win or die, where all options of retreat are cut off and the might of US-Arab forces bear down full bore. Mosul is not that location. That strategy in Mosul will redefine a Pyrrhic victory for our modern times. Mosul is a city that has to become functional again if Iraq seeks a peaceful future. By following a strategy that cuts off retreat the Iraqi government may doom Mosul to complete destruction.

Since ISIL launched their Iraqi offensive in 2014 the Iraqi National Government has struggled to maintain a standing, unified, army. Instead, many of the military counter offensives that have been waged against ISIL are done by the Iraqi National Army (singular in a sense), the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Shi’ite militias of which the main one is the Badr Organization (now the Popular Mobilization Forces). The fight to retake Mosul will see a fourth actor introduced, militias formed out of the Nineveh Province. All told the Iraqi government is forecasting 25 to 35 thousand troops needed to retake Mosul. This will be the first time all four major actors to retake Mosul will be working together with the same goal. None of these actors are unified in the western sense of a military. In the United States there are soldiers, seamen, marines, and airmen of the entire kaleidoscope that makes up the America citizenry. In Iraq the picture is starkly different. The Iraqi National Army is mainly made up of Shi’ites, the Kurdish Peshmerga made up mainly of Kurds, the Shi’ite militias made up of Shi’ites and finally the Nineveh militias’ a mix of Sunni, Christian, as well as other ethnic and religious minorities. It should be noted the bulk of the fighters making up the Nineveh militias will be Sunni’s. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein many ethnic and religious minorities have been driven out of the Nineveh province- this accelerated with ISIL’s invasion.

The four part entity will make up the liberation force tasked with driving out ISIL from Mosul and, one would hope, the ongoing security force to keep Mosul from falling back into ISIL control. From studying civil conflict, the mechanisms that lead people to war, I cannot think of another single example where a country has four different independent forces converging on the same goal. There are plenty of examples of countries working together, which happened when coalition forces drove out Saddam Hussein from Mosul. But the internal forces of a country acting this independently have not been a feature in recent history.

This independent nature of the Iraqi forces converging on Mosul is not positive. Already in Sunni areas that have been “liberated” by Iraqi National Army and Shi’ite militias there is two consistent stories that emerge. The first being how terrible ISIL is as an organization, their barbaric conduct, their wanton disregard for human life, and their obsession with destroying the past. The second focuses on whatever was left standing after ISIL being destroyed by the “liberators”. Shi’ite militias have no interest in preserving Sunni homes. Therefore, if a booby trap is found within a home it’s detonated. If there is a business still standing Shi’ite militias will claim the resources of that business for the war effort- what they are doing actually amounts to looting. When Sunni’s return they usually have nothing left as evidenced in Tikrit and Ramadi. There should be zero expectation that Shi’ite militias will behave any differently once entering Mosul.

In this series of articles we will hope to examine why the current campaign to retake Mosul is tantamount to the destruction of Mosul. That, sometimes, patience is a virtue and when a country acts it should act as a unified force not a fragmented society.

As the end of the year approaches the Iraqi government will begin the final stages of preparation to reclaim the city of Mosul. What will be left of the city of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, is another topic entirely. So far the Iraqi government has been able to retake major swaths of land from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) at a large cost. Each battle for a new city seems to bring another level of destruction. This destruction is not only wrought by ISIL but also caused by the liberating forces. Mosul will be the largest prize for the Iraqi National Army since the city’s fall in 2014. But does the Iraqi government have enough forces to retake Mosul? Are the Iraqi forces unified enough to hold together against what will be a trapped foe? Is the strategic plan to retake Mosul sound to begin with? Better yet, does the Iraqi government have a plan to hold Mosul after a successful military campaign?

Currently the goal of the Iraqi National Army is to envelop the city of Mosul beginning from the North and South, but also cutting off escape routes to the West. Fleeing ISIL fighters to the east will run directly into Kurdish Peshmerga, so the eastern front is effectively blockaded against ISIL. In each battle that the Iraqi National Army, usually backed by the Badr Militia (Shi’ite militia), has successfully won, they have allowed ISIL fighters to leave the combat zone. In Ramadi, ISIL fighters were fleeing the battlefield dressed as women. In Tikrit, ISIL forces once they realized the city was lost packed up their trucks and fled to Mosul. Throughout the successful military operations in the Anbar and Nineveh provinces of Iraq ISIL has been allowed to retreat. Even with the ability to retreat ISIL has made sure to torch oil fields, booby trap homes and roads, as well as leave munitions dumps booby trapped. The invasion into Mosul will see the same type of total warfare tactics displayed by ISIL in Ramadi and Tikrit. It’s understandable that the Iraqi government wants to crush ISIL in Mosul, erase them from the map. Therefore the lure of enveloping Mosul, cutting off all lines of retreat and supply, is a very attractive idea. However, let’s not forget the timeless words of Sun Tzu, from the Art of War–

“To a surrounded enemy, you must leave a way of escape.”

While an old text, there is reason the maxims of Sun Tzu still ring true today; they work. We in the West can look back to World War II where this maxim was put under examination. The Nazi Army was fighting on two fronts, to the west they contended with American and British forces while to the east Russian forces marched to Berlin. American and British forces often allowed for escape routes for Nazi forces, simply because fighting a cornered animal is extremely dangerous. The Russian Army decided the opposite, to envelop a city and to crush all Nazi forces. As the war in mainland Europe drew to a close two distinct patterns emerged. Nazi officers and soldiers on the western front began to surrender en masse to American and British forces. They knew by surrendering their fates would no longer be in their own hands but they may still have a chance to live. This also benefited American and British forces since it eased the burden on their soldiers. Rarely are lives lost when the enemy surrenders. This behavior was partly induced by previously allowing Nazi troops avenues of retreat. It allowed for less loss of life and damage to the existing infrastructure. The fighting on the eastern front of Nazi controlled territory was a literal battle to the death (win or die) until the fall of Berlin. The loss of life and the devastation caused to cities and towns would take decades to rebuild. The Russian Army would take years to rebuild as the causality count of their annihilation strategy tested their man power reserves.

To surround Mosul, allowing ISIL no means of escape will amplify the violence to new levels in Iraq. Instead of weary ISIL fighters thinking of fleeing they will absolutely know it’s either fight or be captured by a predominately Shi’ite force. ISIL is a Sunni organization. The thought that large swaths of Sunni ISIL fighters will surrender to the Iraqi National Army is a fantasy. The belief that ISIL will not amply there force by practically booby trapping as much of the city as possible is a fantasy. The notion that Sunni’s living in ISIL territory, who desperately want to be rid of ISIL, will readily welcome Shi’ite militias as saviors is by far the most fanciful idea. The upcoming battle for Mosul under the current strategy set forth by the Iraqi government may lead to a victory, but Pyrrhic victory. That is to say they indeed may obliterate the ISIL presence in Mosul but at the cost of most of their attacking force. Then who is left to protect the city.

The goal of any terrorist organization is not just to instill a sense of fear and dread amongst the targeted population but to affect change as well. Many times terrorist attacks are reported with a sole focus to the causality count. From a western perspective this makes sense. Since the fighting or the World Wars, even before that in mainland Europe, battles have been thought of in terms of body counts. If we kill more of them, we win, if they kill more of us we lose. This simple, black and white, thinking with regards to terrorism misses a very important aspect of a successful terrorist attack- what happens next.

Since the terrorist attack at the Bataclan theater in France the French government has enacted a rolling martial law. This is turn has suspended some privacy rights that normally are taken for granted by French citizens. After the September 11^th terrorist attacks in the United States in the following months the US PATRIOT ACT was passed through congress and signed by then President Bush. It has undergone revisions but remains largely intact. Both the rolling martial law and US PARTIOT ACT have made inroads into what typical citizens of both countries would consider normal privacy. Giving up this freedom even makes sense to protect against another terrorist attack.

However, the terrorists, then Al-Qaeda and now ISIL view these political changes as successes. It goes to show their attacks have worked. Whether killing 3000, 300, or one singular person the amount of bodies to a terrorist is secondary to what occurs after the attack. Their goal is to change political discourse, erode what a society takes for their normal behavior, and change their targets. This is equally why military strikes alone against Al-Qaeda and ISIL have only degraded their ability to launch terrorist attacks. Their idea’s still remain detached from the amount of bodies their respective organizations may lose. This is different than what western nations faced in World War II; the fall of fascism in Germany was directly tied to the manpower of the Nazi military.

At the time many chuckled at then President’s George W. Bush’s advice to the American public following 9/11, in short, go shop and live your life normally. This advice was exactly the prescription needed to combat the effects of terrorism. Fighting ideas can be difficult, even more difficult when the idea is rooted in a different culture. Every time privacy becomes eroded in the West, or people are more fearful to go out to public places, the terrorists of ISIL get to turn to its followers and proclaim victory. When governments propose more targeted surveillance of ethnic or religious groups (without the groups consent) the terrorists of ISIL get to proclaim another victory. They do so because targeted surveillance, in an uncooperative manner directed at any ethnic group, always becomes moment’s in Western civilization not to be repeated.

Currently I cannot remember the last time President Obama stated “hey just go out and be free, embrace the freedom our country allows” in response to a terrorist attack. We hear “see something say something”. We always hear how we are “winning” listing how many terrorists have been killed since X date in time. We hear how terrorists have lost land. We hear how the terrorists are not an existential threat, even though this is a battle being fought in ideas as much as in physical force. We don’t hear anything with regard to the ideas of freedom vs. tyranny, the tyranny that terrorism represents. Continuing along this rhetorical path allows the terrorists to claim victory as Western society becomes gripped further and further by dread instead of the hope freedom offers.

In the previous article in this two part series we examined how ISIL became ISIS in US media but more importantly we touched on ISIL’s short, intermediate, and long term goals. Now let’s look at what the Levant entails to ensure we, the United States public, understands the totality of what fighting against ISIL means in the future.

If the United States government decides to fight ISIS it will be a losing battle of catastrophic proportions. By combating ISIS the United States, implicitly, admits defeat in other parts of the Middle East. This is why the name ISIL is more fitting, the name the group operates under already.

For western readers who attended Sunday School, remember the ancient maps of the Levant. It did not just include Syria. Over the ebb and flow of history the Levant has included in present day borders all of Israel and Lebanon, a large swath of Jordan and Syria, as well as parts of Egypt (mainly the Sinai region) and the most lower part of Turkey. Thinking about this map should give readers pause- Iraq and Syria is not the battlefield of ISIL, their battlefield is practically the entire coast of the Middle East. The primary concern of media coverage, and now the US presidential campaign, is what the United States is doing to combat ISIS (note the incorrect target) in Syria and Iraq.

• But what is the United States doing to combat ISIL in Turkey? The country where ISIL moves through most of their foreign fighters who will eventually see the battlefield in Syria and Iraq, as well as other parts of the Middle East. US and Turkey are NATO allies but the relationship is strained. Turkey is currently undergoing internal tumult from Kurdish desires of more independent representation/autonomy to terrorists trying to destabilize the Erdogan government.

• What is the United States doing to combat ISIL in Lebanon? Where terrorist attacks have taken place, as they seek to destabilize both the Lebanese government and the Hezbollah shadow government in the south of Lebanon. The United States has little involvement in Lebanon, and zero influence in the south of Lebanon controlled by Hezbollah, a Shi’a organization. Without a plan to help secure the border between Syria and Lebanon the flow of ISIL jihadists into Lebanon will increase. Accomplishing that border security may be untenable with Bashar al-Assad as the sitting president of Syria.

• What is the United States doing to combat ISIL in Israel and the Palestinian controlled territories? In the Palestinian controlled territories there have been efforts on the part of ISIL to recruit locals in effort to attack the PLO, Hamas, and the Israeli government. It may come as a surprise to some US readers but Hamas has actively policed this incitement in the Gaza Strip arresting anyone even just under suspicious of inciting local ISIL violence. As in other parts of the Middle East where Iran exerts influence the United States has little leverage to help aid the Palestinians in securing their territory against an influx of ISIL jihadists. Moreover, any aid to the Palestinian territories may be used to by the Palestinians against Israel. Instead, the United States government should continue to deepen the intelligence sharing with the Israeli government.

• What is the United States doing to combat ISIL in Egypt, mainly the Sinai? The Sinai region has been where ISIL has launched attacks against Egyptian security personnel as well as other terrorist attacks against the civilian population. From a US perspective a stable Egypt is excellent for regional security. Egypt in the past and in the future will be a leading Middle Eastern state helping shape the political dynamics that can jump from one country to the next as with the Arab Spring. Intelligence sharing, figuring out who and where the ISIL members of the Sinai are coming from is necessary to reestablish absolute security over the peninsula. If the Egyptian military asks for weapons or direct air aid the United States government should be open to meeting Egyptian needs. The alternative is a peninsula under more ISIL control than Egyptian control which will put pressure on US allies in Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

• What is the United States doing to combat ISIL in Jordan? Currently Jordan holds close to 5 million refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria. The current population of Jordan is around 8 million people. It is unprecedented in human history for a country of 8 million people to shoulder nearly the entire burden of providing for 5 million refugees. Unlike other areas where ISIL has direct terrorist attacks, and they have in Jordan, their biggest weapon leveled has been funneling refugees to destabilize proportions into Jordan. Without abundant aid the government of Jordan will collapse, providing more fertile recruitment grounds for ISIL. This aid needs to come in both the monetary and tangible form. The Jordanian government already needs more funds to build livable refugee camps, as well as food to help feed five million people. The United States is also a partner with Jordan in the coalition to fight ISIL, this partnership must deepen by providing Jordan more tactical weaponry. The most daunting task, but the most beneficial, would be for the United State government to help set up and enforce a no fly zone in southern Syria. This would allow refugees to move back across the border into their homeland. The longer refugees remain in Jordan the less likely they will return to Syria and the more likely the Jordanian government will collapse attempting to provide for a historic number of refugees. Of all the areas that encompass the battle against ISIL outside of Iraq and Syria, the Jordanian refugee crisis needs to be a top concern for the next United States president.

If the United States decides engaging ISIS is the correct strategy then the above questions cannot even begin to be answered, they cannot even be asked. The above brief prescriptions for dealing with ISIL in those other countries cannot begin to be worked on fighting ISIS.  Limiting the engagement to only two countries is a terrible a policy. Even with the defeat of ISIS, remember just Iraq and Syria, all those other countries where ISIL has a presence will still be operating as normal. With the power base destroyed in Raqqa, Syria watch for a more robust ISIL presence in the Sinai. With the securing of the Iraqi Anbar province expect Jordan to become completely destabilized. As Turkey begins to lock down and secure their border expect the borders between Lebanon and Syria to be erased.

However, if the next United States president decides to fight ISIL then the battle can be won. A comprehensive strategy can be put into place that accounts for all the US allies in the Middle East where ISIL is present. By looking at the total picture ISIL will not be able to achieve its short, medium and long term goals. A byproduct of a comprehensive strategy, which accounts for all US allies, is the future protection against other groups in the mold of ISIL. By deepening intelligence sharing between the US and Egypt as well as the US an Israel, along with providing material support, both countries will be better suited to combat threats emanating from outside of their borders. By aiding Jordan through one of its most tumultuous historical periods a country will emerge, in the heart of the Middle East, as a stronger than before with more capabilities to help their neighboring states. With a no-fly zone in Syria, finally, for the first time since the Syria civil war began people can return to their homes, hopefully reigniting the pride they had in being Syrian and making sure ISIL finds no home within their country. The battle of names, between ISIS and ISIL, may just be as important as on the ground activities. While they may have a head start, a western population accustomed to using ISIS, this is a marathon and it’s time to call the terrorists by their real name- the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Let’s keep this very simple, if the United States decides to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) we lose, if we decide to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) we win. A key reason behind this assessment is the fact ISIS does not exist, it never has existed. The only place where ISIS gets any sort of traction is in United States media publications. If one were to check Arab and Kurdish based newspapers, such as Al-Arabiya and Rudaw, you would find ISIL mentioned far, far, more often than ISIS.

How ISIS became a common term in the United States is a simple one, it’s easy to say. The name also carries with it current borders within the Middle East, namely Iraq and Syria. Although the Syria that ISIL refers to is not the current border of Syria today. Instead the S, what we call Syria, ISIL calls al-Sham. Their version of al-Sham is more akin to Greater Syria, which in the west commonly referred to as the Levant. Therefore, it is very easy to understand why United States media, and at times, the US government have used ISIS as the preferred nomenclature of a barbaric terrorist organization. Yet ISIL itself does not go by the name ISIS, why should it? It has no bearing on their stated goals or intended borders. A fight against ISIS would only be a fight against ISIL’s short term goal, which is just to remain in existence. It would be wise to understand a bit more about the intermediate and end goal of ISIL.

ISIL, under Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, has declared itself a Caliphate. It isn’t but sometimes perception is greater than reality. It is however a de facto state whether or not other countries want to deem it such. To be a true Caliphate the Caliph must control the Islamic Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. This is one of the chief rolls of the Caliph outside of constant border expansion is to secure and administer over these cities directly. Look at the title of the King of Saudi Arabia, the current and all the former kings. In what is a very robust title, one part is of particular significance, “Custodian of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina”. All the Kings of Saudi Arabia have been a caretaker, a placeholder, who would be replaced by a Caliph- an administrator. To reach Saudi Arabia, ISIL has a few different paths that they can try to take. All of which under the current setting seem impossible. This is ISIL’s intermediate goal, capturing the cities of Mecca and Medina, but without a doubt the first city is always Mecca.

From that perspective let’s look at different ways ISIL can gain entrance into Saudi Arabia with the goal of capturing Mecca.

To begin, the most likely path to Saudi Arabia would be from Syria, into the Iraqi Anbar province, then into Saudi Arabia. However, this would still leave them a far distance away from Mecca, needing to cross the entirety of the Arabian Peninsula while trying to fight against a fully armed, modern, Saudi Arabian government backed by US support. This path would be as destructive to ISIL as it would be to the countries they move through.

Next, now this is where the “Levant” aspect of ISIL matters, is to march out of lower Syria through Jordan, and into Saudi Arabia. As long as the Kingdom of Jordan maintains governing stability this route will also lead to the decimation of ISIL forces. However, a destabilized Jordan, can be much easier to navigate. There will be many disenfranchised Sunni’s that ISIL can target for recruitment from both Jordan’s indigenous population and refugee population. While unlikely now, if ISIL persist for five or more years this becomes a real possibility.

Finally, the last route to Saudi Arabia ISIL has may be the most unlikely but, at the same time, the route they may like the most. Instead of moving directly south as the previous two routes indicated in this example ISIL moves west into Lebanon. Then down through Israeli/Palestinian controlled areas toward the Egyptian Sinai. Thinking of the big picture the previous two routes would force ISIL to move across most of Saudi Arabia, also it would remove a true Caliph from any route that would help in gaining control of Jerusalem; a city a Caliph also needs for legitimacy. ISIL already has a strong presence in the Sinai so the most difficult part would be moving men through the Palestinian lands and Northern Israel. Once into the Sinai moving directly south one could follow the coastline directly to Mecca. In this instance no need to cross Saudi Arabia, just move down.

In following path three ISIL would also benefit from the most captured territory. For a Caliph to be legitimate in the 650 to 1300 AD sense, he would need to continually expand borders. That is an amorphous long term goal. Since borders can always ebb and flow losing for a year doesn’t fully delegitimize a Caliph if he can expand either elsewhere or in the following years reclaim that lost land.

This is what ISIL desires. Fighting against ISIS would leave out all the aforementioned countries not named Iraq and Syria. Defeating ISIS still means ISIL is present in the Sinai, still means ISIL is attempting to recruit disenfranchised Sunni Arabs in Jordan, Palestinian Territories, and Egypt. Most important beating ISIS still means ISIL actually exists (short term goal achieved).